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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions
with resale. We add speculators—bidders with value zero—to the
standard symmetric independent private values environment. There
always exists a continuum of ineﬃcient equilibria that are proﬁtable
for a speculator. With no reserve price in the initial auction, specu-
lation can enhance the initial seller’s expected revenue. On the other
hand, speculation can harm the initial seller even if she commits to
an optimal reserve price. Our results are valid for English auctions as
well.
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1 Introduction
There is abounding evidence of resale following auctions. Even in markets
where resale is expressly forbidden, it is common practice.1 Despite all this,
relatively little is known about the theoretical properties of auctions with
resale. Meanwhile, standard auction formats continue to be used without a
full understanding of the implications of resale opportunities.
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1Spectrum is allocated by auction in many countries. Some impose “use-it-or-lose-it”
conditions designed to prevent resale. However, these restrictions are easy to circumvent
and there are reported instances where “shell” companies were formed for the purpose of
acquiring spectrum licences and then sold.
1Opportunities for resale change the auction environment in numerous
ways. The explicit recognition of multiple periods allows for the possibility
of information arrivals and changes in the bidder population that aﬀect how
the initial seller and buyers should behave. Moreover, resale presents an oth-
erwise absent opportunity for speculators or “shill” bidders to participate
in the auction. Our main purpose in this paper is to examine the role of
speculators in standard second-price or English auctions with resale. Spec-
ulators are zero-value traders whose sole motivation for participating in the
auction is to make a proﬁt by purchasing the good and then reselling it at
a higher price. We construct equilibria in which speculators play an impor-
tant role. In particular, we show that speculation can be socially harmful,
yet proﬁtable for a speculator and revenue enhancing for the initial seller.
These results contradict the commonly held notion that in environments
with private values the opportunity for resale does not distort the second-
price auction.2
Our results correct a misconception about resale. While it is known
that ineﬃcient auction outcomes are not necessarily corrected by resale (see
McAfee, 1998, or Krishna, 2002, Ch. 4.4), resale is generally perceived to
be beneﬁcial for eﬃciency because it provides an opportunity to improve
upon “mistakes” made in the initial auction. We show that, in fact, the
possibility of resale can increase ineﬃciency because of the role it creates for
speculators.
We consider a two-stage game in which a seller oﬀers a good via a second-
price auction to a group consisting of at least one speculator and regular
buyers with symmetric independent private values. The winner can either
consume the good or put it up for resale. The resale environment is identical
to the initial auction environment: no new bidders arrive after the initial
auction, and no information becomes public beyond what is revealed via
bids. Our ﬁnding that speculators can play a role in such a constant private
values environment implies that speculators are important in a changing
environment as well.
All our results are based on the existence of a continuum of ineﬃcient
perfect Bayesian equilibria. For any probability q > 0, we construct an
equilibrium such that one speculator enters the initial auction and wins
with probability q. This includes the case q = 1 in which the speculator
wins the initial auction for sure. In all our equilibria, the good is resold
with positive probability and the speculator has a positive expected payoﬀ.3
2This view comes from intuition derived from symmetric equilibria in symmetric envi-
ronments. See, for example, results in Ausubel and Cramton (1999) and Haile (1999).
3Tr¨ oger (2003) shows that the situation is rather diﬀerent in a ﬁrst-price auction.
2The speculator’s expected payoﬀ is bounded above by her bid in the initial
auction. Hence, a second speculator never has an incentive to enter.
Our equilibria are valid for a large class of resale mechanisms. We ﬁrst
consider the case where speculators, but not regular buyers, can oﬀer the
good for resale. In this case, our equilibria are valid for arbitrary resale
mechanisms, provided the speculator has suﬃcient bargaining power. In
particular, the speculator’s resale mechanism may involve a single period
or many periods or may be a simple take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Secondly, we
consider the case where the speculator’s resale mechanism requires that the
good is oﬀered via a second-price auction. In this case, our equilibria are
valid no matter what resale mechanism regular buyers may use; the regular
buyer who wins the initial auction may even obtain the total surplus that is
available in the resale market. In particular, our equilibria are valid if every
agent, buyer or speculator, can oﬀer the good for resale via a second-price
auction with an optimal reserve price.
The key to understanding our equilibria is to recognize that when resale
is permitted, value-bidding is not part of a weakly dominant strategy for
any bidder. In the equilibria we construct, low-value buyers prefer to pool
at a bid of zero because otherwise they will either have to bid quite high to
win the auction, or lose and get a bad resale oﬀer because their bid signals
a high value. High-value buyers bid their values. The speculator makes an
intermediate bid such that whenever she wins she gets the good for free.
We ask whether speculation can help or harm the initial seller. I.e., we
compare the initial seller’s expected revenue in our equilibria to her expected
revenue in the dominant-strategy equilibrium of the second-price auction
without resale. There always exists an equilibrium (q = 1) in which the ini-
tial seller’s revenue equals zero. Thus, speculation can harm the initial seller
in any market with at least two regular buyers. Surprisingly, speculation can
also help the initial seller, although the speculator acts independently of the
seller and makes the market ineﬃcient. We show that equilibria with q suﬃ-
ciently close to 0 increase seller revenue if the speculator’s resale mechanism
is a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price.
The impact of speculators is not eliminated if the initial seller is allowed
to set a reserve price in the initial auction. Provided the reserve price set by
the initial seller is not too high then equilibria exist in which a speculator
wins with positive probability and makes positive expected proﬁt. Moreover,
if the speculator’s resale mechanism is a second-price auction with optimal
There, speculation is not proﬁtable for any resale mechanism, at least if only one regular
buyer is in the market.
3reserve price then an equilibrium exists in which the initial seller sets a
reserve price above the price she would set in the absence of resale, and
earns smaller proﬁts.
Resale via a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price is an
interesting case that merits special attention. If the distribution function
for buyer values satisﬁes Myerson’s regularity property then, given the pos-
terior beliefs in our equilibria, this resale mechanism maximizes the resale
revenue among all conceivable mechanisms (Myerson, 1981); i.e., this is a
mechanism that the resale seller often likes to use if she is free to choose
among mechanisms. In addition, the scenario where speculators buy and
sell in a second-price auction mechanism captures aspects of trading in on-
line auction houses such as eBay, Yahoo, and Amazon. The participation
of speculators in on-line auction houses is suggested by an abundance of
individuals with very high numbers of buyer and seller feedback.
Private-value auctions with resale have been examined by Haile (1999,
2000, 2003) and Gupta and Lebrun (1999) but these works do not examine
the role of speculators. Moreover, in these papers resale emerges not as an
alternative to the bid-your-value equilibrium, but rather as a direct con-
sequence of changes in the environment between periods. In Haile (1999),
resale results from the arrival of new buyers in the resale market. In Haile
(2000, 2003) and Gupta and Lebrun (1999), resale occurs because agents
receive new information about their private values or values are made pub-
lic after the initial auction. Gupta and Lebrun (1999) allow for asymmetry
between the two bidders in a ﬁrst-price auction, but their assumptions do
not permit traders with commonly known values like the speculators in our
model.
The work that comes closest to modelling speculators in auctions is
Bikhchandani and Huang (1989). They consider resale in an environment
where all bidders in the initial auction bid solely for the purpose of resale.
Bids are based on privately observed signals about the common value of the
goods in the secondary market. The role of the bidders in the initial auc-
tion is to aggregate information and to transfer the goods to the secondary
market. This is important for evaluating diﬀerent auction mechanisms for
selling treasury bills. They do not address speculation in auctions with
regular buyers.
Resale has also been incorporated into the study of optimal auctions
(cf. Ausubel and Cramton (1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999), Zheng
(2002), and Calzolari and Pavan (2002)). Much of this work builds on the
implementation results of Myerson (1981). Ausubel and Cramton show how
resale possibilities can make seller-revenue maximization compatible with
4eﬃciency. Jehiel and Moldovanu examine whether the Coasian notion that
the initial assignment of property rights has no eﬀect on eﬃciency holds
when resale occurs according to optimal mechanisms in an environment with
private values (but no private information) and negative consumption exter-
nalities. Our work is more closely related to Zheng (2002) and Calzolari and
Pavan (2002). Zheng identiﬁes conditions that are suﬃcient to implement
seller-optimal outcomes when (repeated) resale is permitted. The mecha-
nism provided by Zheng reduces, in our case, to a second-price auction with
an optimal reserve price in the ﬁrst stage. Then, the bid-your-value equi-
librium does in fact maximize seller revenue. However, our results indicate
that other equilibria exist, that are substantially less proﬁtable for the ini-
tial seller. Finally, Calzolari and Pavan assume, contrary to Zheng, that the
distribution of bargaining power in the resale market is a function of the
identity of the buyers. In a version of their model, where the set of bidders
remains constant across periods, they ﬁnd that resale is necessarily revenue
decreasing for the initial seller. Our results show that in fact resale can cause
seller revenue to increase even if all the bargaining power is preassigned to
one of the bidders provided that bidder is a speculator.
We start oﬀ in Section 2 with one buyer and one speculator, in order to
illustrate the structure of the equilibria that we construct for the multiple-
buyer case. Section 3 contains the general model and the deﬁnition of the
equilibrium concept. Section 4 constructs the equilibria with speculation
on which all our results are based. Basic properties of these equilibria are
established. We show that our equilibria remain valid if the initial auction
is replaced by an English auction. The results in Section 5 pertain to re-
sale via a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price. In Section 6
we discuss how our equilibria change when the initial seller sets a reserve
price. In Section 7 we discuss numerous issues including alternative oﬀ-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs, equilibrium selection, and ineﬃcient equilibria
without speculators. Appendix A reviews conditional distribution functions.
Appendix B contains proofs.
2 Resale With One Buyer and One Speculator
Before presenting the model and results for multiple buyers, let us consider
a market with one regular buyer and a speculator. A good is oﬀered via a
second-price auction without reserve price. The winner of the auction can
oﬀer the good for resale via posting a take-it-or-leave-it price. The buyer has
a private value for the good that is distributed on [0;1] according to some
5strictly increasing and continuous distribution function F(¢). The specula-
tor has value zero. Without the resale possibility, each agent’s dominant
strategy would be to bid her value, and an eﬃcient allocation would be
guaranteed. The same equilibrium outcome can occur if resale is possible,
but there exist many other equilibria with very diﬀerent properties.
We will establish that for any number µ¤ > 0, there exists a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium such that if the buyer’s value is not larger than µ¤ then
she bids 0 and waits for the resale oﬀer, but if her value exceeds µ¤ then
she bids her value and consumes the good immediately if she wins. Given
this, for the speculator, any bid b¤
s 2 (0;µ¤) is optimal. She expects to pay
0 when she wins. After winning, the support of her posterior distribution
for the buyer’s value is [0;µ¤]. Thus, she will make some take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer r¤ 2 (0;µ¤) and have a positive expected payoﬀ in equilibrium. There
is clearly no proﬁtable deviation from b¤
s. The only deviations that change
her expected payoﬀ are bs = 0 or any bid bs > µ¤. By bidding bs = 0, the
speculator might lose the tie against the buyer and thereby forego her resale
revenue. A deviation to bs > µ¤ changes the speculator’s realized payoﬀ only
in the event that the buyer’s value is in (µ¤;bs], but then the speculator’s
resale revenue will not exceed her payment in the initial auction.
Now suppose b¤
s is deﬁned such that the buyer with the “marginal” value
µ¤ is indiﬀerent between overbidding the speculator in the initial auction and
waiting for resale; i.e.,
µ¤ ¡ b¤
s = ±(µ¤ ¡ r¤);
where ± < 1 is the discount factor. Buyers with value above µ¤ will then
strictly prefer to win the initial auction rather than to wait for resale, while
for buyers with a value in (r¤;µ¤) the opposite is true.4 Now suppose that
the buyer deviates to a bid in (0;b¤
s]. Because such a bid does not occur in
equilibrium, the speculator cannot use Bayesian updating to form a posterior
belief about the buyer’s value; we may assume that the speculator believes
that the value of the deviating buyer is µ¤. As a result, the speculator will
post a take-it-or-leave-it price of µ¤. Because the buyer could get a take-
it-or-leave-it price of r¤ < µ¤ by bidding 0, she has no incentive to deviate
to a bid in (0;b¤
s]. Finally, note that a potential second speculator has no
incentive to enter the auction because she can win only by bidding at least b¤
s
while her resale revenue is bounded above by r¤ < b¤
s. Thus, the equilibrium
4Note that a buyer with value below r
¤ does not expect to be able to get an acceptable
resale oﬀer. So, she is indiﬀerent between bidding and not bidding in period 1. However,
in contrast to a second-price auction without resale, bidding 0 is not weakly dominated
by any positive bid.
6remains valid with free entry of speculators.
In the equilibrium constructed around any µ¤ 2 [0;1] the speculator wins
the auction with probability F(µ¤). Hence all winning probabilities between
0 and 1 are supported by equilibria. There are two sources of ineﬃciency in
each of these equilibria. First, if the buyer’s value is in [0;r¤) then the good is
not consumed. Second, if the buyer’s value is in [r¤;µ¤] then the consumption
of the good is delayed from period 1 to period 2. Therefore, when resale
is possible the second-price auction loses what has been propagated as one
of its main advantages in environments with private values: to assure an
eﬃcient allocation.
In all equilibria the initial seller’s revenue is positive while they would
be 0 with resale not being possible; i.e., speculation boosts the initial seller’s
revenue. In this simple example, this is a trivial consequence of there be-
ing only one regular buyer. We show later that with two or more regular
buyers in the market, some equilibria raise initial seller’s revenue and other
equilibria reduce it.
With only one buyer in the market, if the initial seller sets a reserve price
that is optimal without resale, no speculator will be attracted (because her
resale revenue would not make up for what she has to pay in the initial
auction). Thus, the possibility of resale does no harm to a seller who sets an
optimal reserve price. We will show that this changes if at least two regular
buyers are in the market.
3 Model
There are n ¸ 2 risk-neutral buyers, who are interested in buying a single
indivisible object, called the good. The good is initially owned by a seller
who oﬀers the good via a second-price auction without reserve price (positive
reserve prices will be addressed in Section 5). Buyer i = 1;:::;n has the
random value ˜ µi 2 [0;1] for the good. A risk-neutral agent called speculator
s who has no use value for the good will also be included in the model; deﬁne
µs = 0. The restriction to a single speculator simpliﬁes the presentation; we
will argue that our equilibria remain valid with free entry of speculators (see
below Proposition 1). Our setup contrasts other market models with resale
where speculators are not considered.
We assume the standard symmetric independent-private-values model
(e.g., Krishna, 2002) where the random variables ˜ µ1;:::; ˜ µn representing
buyer’s values are stochastically independent and all have the same dis-
tribution function F(¢) that is diﬀerentiable on (0;1) with F0 > 0 and
7satisﬁes F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1. We will also use the random vari-
able ˜ µs = 0, and the vector random variables ˜ µ = (˜ µ1;:::; ˜ µn) and ˜ µ¡i =
(˜ µ1;:::; ˜ µi¡1; ˜ µi+1;:::;µn).
Before period 1, buyer i = 1;:::;n privately learns the realization of her
value, ˜ µi = µi. In period 1, a second-price auction without reserve price
takes place. All buyers as well as the speculator simultaneously submit
bids b1(µ1);:::;bn(µn);bs = bs(0) ¸ 0. The highest bidding agent becomes
the new owner of the good. If there are several highest bids, the winner
is determined by an independent and fair random draw. The trade price
p1 in period 1 equals the second-highest bid. We assume that bids are not
publicly announced, but the winner’s payment, p1, becomes public (Remark
1 concerns relaxing this assumption). All agents will use the information
incorporated in p1 in order to update their beliefs about the values of the
other bidders. For all i 6= s and bi ¸ 0, let Π
bi
i (¢ j ¢) denote a conditional
distribution function5 for ˜ µ¡i conditional on the random variable
˜ p
bi
i = maxfbi;maxfbj(˜ µj) j j 6= i;sgg:
The distribution function Π
bi
i (¢ j p1) represents buyer i’s posterior belief
about ˜ µ¡i after submitting the bid bi and making the observation p1 = ˜ p
bi
i .
She makes this observation when the speculator wins at price p1. Whenever
a conditional expectation based on such an observation will be considered
below, we implicitly refer to the conditional distribution function Π
bi
i (¢ j ¢).
Below we construct posterior distribution functions such that for b0
i <
bi < p1 we have Π
b0
i
i (¢ j p1) = Π
bi
i (¢ j p1). I.e., a buyer’s posterior beliefs do
not depend on her own bid as long as her bid has no impact on the outcome
of the auction. On the other hand, the beliefs can depend on whether or not
bi = p1. If bi < p1 then buyer i learns that there exists one other buyer who
has bid p1, and all remaining buyers have bid not more than p1. If bi = p1
then she only learns that all other buyers have bid not more than p1; she
cannot learn anything about whether another buyer has bid precisely p1.
Let Πs(¢ j ¢) denote a conditional distribution function for the vector of
buyer values ˜ µ, conditional on the random variable
˜ p1
s = maxfbj(˜ µj) j j 6= sg:
The distribution function Πs(¢ j p1) represents the speculator’s posterior
belief about ˜ µ after making the observation p1 = ˜ p1
s. She makes this obser-
vation when she wins at price p1. Whenever a conditional expectation based
5Conditional distribution functions generalize Bayes rule to arbitrary probability dis-
tributions. See Appendix A for a brief review.
8on such an observation will be considered below, we implicitly refer to the
conditional distribution function Πs(¢ j ¢).
In period 2 a resale market opens with the same participants as in period
1. Agents have a discount factor of ± 2 (0;1) between periods 1 and 2; i.e., in
period 1 a bidder with value µi is willing to pay ±µi for the right to consume
the good in period 2. Any agent might have an incentive to make a bid above
her value in an attempt to buy the good in period 1 and sell it in period 2.
We will construct equilibria where one agent, the speculator, submits a bid
above her value.
We allow for the possibility that not all agents have access to the same
resale mechanism. For now, let us focus on the case where buyers cannot
resell, while the speculator can. In Proposition 2 we address the case where
all agents can resell. Given that the speculator wins in period 1, a resale
mechanism gp1
(¢) is played among buyers. The speculator’s actions in pe-
riod 2 are reﬂected in the dependence of the resale mechanism on p1. For
example, the resale mechanism can be an auction for which, depending on
p1, the speculator determines a reserve price or an entry fee (the implicit
independence of the speculator’s period-1 bid bs is innocuous because the




a = (a1;:::;an) (ai 2 Ai; i = 1;:::;n)
lists the actions taken by the buyers in period 2, pi(a) denotes buyer i’s
expected payment in period 2, and qi(a) denotes the probability that buyer
i obtains the good in period 2. A period-2 strategy for buyer i is a function
¾i : f(p1;bi) j 0 · bi · p1g £ [0;1] ! Ai; (p1;bi;µi) 7! ¾i(p1;bi;µi)
that depends on her observation p1, her period-1 bid bi, and her type µi (we
allow for dependence on bi because the buyer’s posterior beliefs may depend
on bi).
For all i 6= s, µ¡i 2 [0;1]n, and p1 ¸ 0, we use the shortcut
¾
p1
¡i(µ¡i) = (¾j(p1;bj(µj);µj)(j 6= i;s))
for the period-2 actions taken by buyers other than i who follow their bid
functions bj(¢) (j 6= i;s) in period 1. For all µ = (µ1;:::;µn) 2 [0;1]n and
p1 ¸ 0, we use the shortcut
¾p1
(µ) = (¾j(p1;bj(µj);µj)(j 6= s))
9for the period-2 actions taken after all buyers follow their bid functions.
For buyer i, the probability of obtaining the good in period 2 when taking
action ai 2 Ai is denoted
Q
p1;bi
i (ai) = E[qi(ai;¾
p1
¡i(˜ µ¡i)) j p1 = ˜ p
bi
i ]:
The respective expected payment is denoted
P
p1;bi
i (ai) = E[pi(ai;¾
p1
¡i(˜ µ¡i)) j p1 = ˜ p
bi
i ]:
For buyer i, the probability of obtaining the good in period 2, when acting
in period 2 as if she had type µ0
i 2 [0;1], after submitting the bid bi ¸ 0 in





























i (˜ µi) j p1 = ˜ p1
s]: (3)
For any combination of bids b1;:::;bn;bs ¸ 0 in period 1, let ˜ w(b1;:::;bn;bs)
denote the random variable that determines the winner of the auction in
period 1. For all agents i (including i = s), let
˜ b¡i = (bj(˜ µj))j6=i; ˜ b
(1)
¡i = maxfbj(˜ µj) j j 6= ig;
denote the list of all other agents’ bids and, respectively, the highest among
those bids. The expected payoﬀ of buyer i with type µi as a function of her






























s ¡ ˜ p1
s
´
¢ 1 ˜ w(bs;˜ b¡s)=s
i
: (5)
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the second-price auction with the collec-
tion of resale mechanisms (gp1




1 (¢ j ¢);:::;Π(¢)
n (¢ j ¢);Πs(¢ j ¢))
such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
8i = 1;:::;n; µi 2 [0;1]; p1 ¸ bi ¸ 0 :




i (ai)µi ¡ P
p1;bi
i (ai); (6)
8i = 1;:::;n; µi 2 [0;1]; p1 ¸ bi ¸ 0 :
Q
p1;bi
i (µi)µi ¡ P
p1;bi
i (µi) ¸ 0; (7)
8p1 ¸ 0 : Pp1
s ¸ 0: (8)







Condition (6) requires that the buyers choose optimal period-2 actions. A
similar optimality requirement for the speculator is not introduced because
it would not play any role for our results. Conditions (7) and (8) reﬂect
voluntary participation in the resale market. Conditions (9) and (10) require
that bids in period 1 are chosen optimally. Note that we have not introduced
the action “stay out of the initial auction” because bidding 0 is at least as
good as that.
A second speculator (having access to the same resale mechanism as the
ﬁrst) will have an incentive to enter the initial auction only if there exists a
positive bid such that her expected revenue is positive. For the equilibria we
construct we will show that a second speculator has no incentive to enter.
The following properties of the outcome of the resale market are impor-
tant. The proof is a standard application of the envelope theorem (see, e.g.,
Milgrom and Segal, 2002).
Lemma 1 Consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Then, for all i 6= s and
p1 ¸ bi ¸ 0, the functions Q
p1;bi
i (¢) and P
p1;bi
i (¢) are weakly increasing. For
all 0 · µ0
i · µi · 1 we have
Q
p1;bi
i (µi)µi ¡ P
p1;bi













i (ˆ µ)dˆ µ:
11Throughout the paper we will always assume that the speculator’s resale
mechanism is such that, for the buyers’ period-1 bid functions and posterior
beliefs that we construct, an equilibrium in the resale mechanism exists; i.e.,
there exist period-2 strategies (¾1(¢);:::;¾n(¢)) such that (6), (7), and (8)
are satisﬁed. Furthermore, we make three assumptions on the speculator’s
resale mechanism. The ﬁrst two essentially provide a lower bound for the
speculator’s bargaining power in the resale market, the third is a symmetry
assumption.
Our ﬁrst assumption requires that if the speculator wins at a price that
reveals the highest value among buyers with certainty to her, then she can
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer identical to the highest value. I.e., the spec-
ulator has full bargaining power in the case where she is certain about the
available surplus.
Assumption 1 Consider any p1 ¸ 0 such that the ﬁrst order statistic of
Πs(¢ j p1) has the distribution function ˆ µ 7! 1ˆ µ¸µ0 for some µ0 > 0. Then the
outcome of the resale mechanism gp1
(¢) equals the outcome of a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer at price µ0.
The second assumption requires that if the speculator wins the initial auction
and in expectation a positive surplus is available in period 2, the speculator
captures some part of that surplus, no matter how small. Without such an
assumption it is hard to see how a speculator could be attracted.
Assumption 2 Consider any p1 ¸ 0 such that the posterior Πs(¢ j p1) puts
probability less than 1 on the value proﬁle (0;:::;0). Then the outcome of
the resale mechanism gp1
(¢) is such that
Pp1
s > 0:
The third assumption requires that the resale market treats symmetric buy-
ers symmetrically. This assumption will allow us to construct equilibria of
the overall game that are symmetric among buyers.
Assumption 3 Consider any p1 ¸ 0 such that Πs(¢ j p1) induces inde-
pendent and identical marginal distributions for the buyers’ values, and all
buyers i = 1;:::;n submit the same bid b¤ · p1 and have the same pos-
terior Π¤(¢) = Πb¤
i (¢ j p1). Then the functions Q
p1;b¤




12Many of our results rely on the following collection of resale mechanisms.
We call (gp1
(¢))p1¸0 a second-price auction with optimal reserve price if for
all p1 ¸ 0 the mechanism gp1
(¢) is a second-price auction with a reserve
price that is optimal given the posterior Πs(¢ j p1), provided all buyers bid
their values in period 2. Whenever we consider this collection of resale
mechanisms, we will focus on equilibria where buyers bid their values in
period 2.
Assumptions 1 to 3 are satisﬁed if the speculator’s resale mechanism is a
second-price auction with optimal reserve price. Similarly, the assumptions
are satisﬁed if the speculator’s resale mechanism is a ﬁrst-price auction with
optimal reserve price, is restricted to an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, or
is a second-price auction without a reserve price. Alternatively, the spec-
ulator’s resale mechanism may include multiple stages (here, agents may
discount payments and probabilities depending on the stage within period
2). For example, a resale mechanism in which the speculator makes multi-
ple consecutive take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers until one is accepted,6 also satisﬁes
Assumptions 1 to 3.
4 Speculation with General Resale Mechanisms
In this section, we construct the equilibria on which all our results are based.
These equilibria are such that the speculator wins the auction in period 1
with positive probability, and bids in period 1 generally diﬀer from values.
This contrasts the environment without resale possibility where it is a dom-
inant strategy for each bidder to bid her value. With a resale possibility,
there still exists an equilibrium with value-bidding and no resale occurrence,
but no agent has a dominant strategy.





n(¢ j ¢);Πs(¢ j ¢))
such that the speculator wins with probability q in period 1. Deﬁne µ¤ 2
(0;1] by Fn(µ¤) = q, and deﬁne buyers’ bid functions such that any buyer
with a value above µ¤ bids her value, while all other buyers bid 0. I.e., for
6Such a market makes particular sense if the good is durable. The Coase conjecture
then suggests equilibria where the take-it-or-leave-it price drops quickly, but there can
also exist other equilibria where the price drops slowly (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989).
13all i 6= s and µi 2 [0;1], let
bi(µi) =
½
0 if µi · µ¤;
µi if µi > µ¤:
Let us now construct the conditional distribution functions on which the
agents’ posterior beliefs after period 1 are based. To deﬁne these functions,
we make use of the distribution functions ˆ Fb(¢) = minfF(¢)=F(b);1g for all
b 2 (0;1]. For all µ = (µ1;:::;µn) 2 [0;1]n and p1 2 [0;1], let

















j62fs;ig ˆ Fp1(µj) if p1 > µ¤:
In words, if the speculator pays 0 then she concludes that every buyer’s value
is distributed according to ˆ Fµ¤(¢); i.e., she learns that everybody’s value is at
most µ¤. If she wins at a price in (0;µ¤]—an out-of-equilibrium event—then
she believes that the highest value among buyers is µ¤ and this value might
come with equal probability from every buyer (see Remark 2 for alternative
oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs). Similarly, if she pays more than µ¤ then she
concludes that the highest value equals her payment, and the highest value
belongs to each of the buyers with the same probability.
Buyer i’s posterior beliefs are deﬁned as follows. For all µ¡i 2 [0;1]n¡1,
p1 2 [0;1], and bi ¸ 0, let
Π
bi
i (µ¡i j p1)
=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
Q












k62fs;i;jg ˆ Fp1(µk) if p1 > bi and p1 > µ¤;
Q
j62fs;ig ˆ Fp1(µj) if p1 = bi and p1 > µ¤;
any distribution function if p1 < bi:
Let us ﬁrst understand these beliefs in the case p1 > bi; i.e., some other buyer
has bid higher than buyer i. Buyer i then conditions on the observation that
the highest bid among other buyers equals p1. Any such bid between 0 and
µ¤ is out-of-equilibrium and buyer i then believes that the highest value
among other buyers is µ¤; note that this is consistent with the speculator’s
beliefs. If p1 > µ¤ then buyer i concludes that the highest value among other
buyers equals p1 and this value belongs to each of the other buyers with the
same probability.
14Now consider the case p1 = bi. Here, buyer i conditions on the observa-
tion that the highest bid among other buyers is not larger than p1. If p1 = 0
then buyer i only concludes that no other buyer has a value above µ¤. She
has the same belief if p1 2 (0;µ¤] because then she has no reason to believe
that anybody but herself has deviated from equilibrium. If p1 > µ¤ then the
only thing she can conclude is that nobody has a value above p1.
The beliefs in the remaining case p1 < bi are irrelevant because the event
˜ p
bi
i < bi is empty, by deﬁnition of ˜ p
bi
i . In Appendix B we prove the following.
Lemma 2 For all i 6= s and bi ¸ 0, the function Π
bi
i (¢ j ¢) is a conditional
distribution function. The function Πs(¢ j ¢) is a conditional distribution
function.
Given the buyers’ period-1 bid functions and the posterior beliefs, let
¾1(¢);:::; ¾n(¢) be any proﬁle of period-2 strategies such that (6), (7), and
(8) are satisﬁed.
By Assumption 3, there exist functions P(¢) and Q(¢) such that P(¢) =
P
0;0
i and Q(¢) = Q
0;0
i for all buyers i. We deﬁne the speculator’s bid by
b¤
s = µ¤ ¡ ± (µ¤Q(µ¤) ¡ P(µ¤)): (11)
The following lemma, proved in Appendix B, determines the speculator’s
winning probability and payoﬀ. The speculator submits a bid between 0
and µ¤. Thus she wins in period 1 if and only if no buyer’s value exceeds µ¤.
In particular, if she wins then she does so at price p1 = 0. Together with
Assumption 2 this implies that her expected payoﬀ is positive.
Lemma 3 Given the construction above, b¤
s 2 (0;µ¤). Moreover, the spec-




s > 0; (12)
where
P0
s = nE[P(µi) j µi · µ¤] > 0: (13)
It remains to be shown that the agents’ bids in period 1 are optimal.






s =2 if bs = 0;
q±P0













if bs > µ¤;
15where ˜ µ
(1)
¡i denotes the random variable for the highest value among buyers
other than i. From the payoﬀ function us(¢), equilibrium condition (10) is
immediate. The speculator is indiﬀerent between bids between 0 and µ¤
because no buyer submits such a bid. Bidding 0 is not optimal because it
reduces the speculator’s chances to win and make a period-2 proﬁt. Bidding
more than µ¤ is not optimal because in the event that she needs such a high
bid in order to win, her payment in period 1 equals the highest value among
all buyers.




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
Fn¡1(µ¤)(µiQ(µi) ¡ P(µi)) if bi = 0;










if bi = b¤
s;
Fn¡1(µ¤)(µi ¡ b¤












if bi ¸ µ¤:
(14)
The crucial step in the veriﬁcation of equilibrium condition (9) is that buyers
with value µi < µ¤ prefer to bid 0 and wait for resale rather than bid µ¤,
while for buyers with µi > µ¤ the opposite is true, and type µ¤ is indiﬀerent
between bidding her value and waiting for resale. This is shown in Lemma
4, the proof of which can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4 Given the construction above, for all i 6= s and µi 2 [0;1], buyer





¸ ui(0;µi) if µi > µ¤;
= ui(0;µi) if µi = µ¤;
· ui(0;µi) if µi < µ¤:
Once we have this, verifying equilibrium condition (9) is straightforward.
In particular, types below µ¤ pool at bid 0 rather than bid their value be-
cause otherwise the speculator gets too optimistic about the deviator’s value.
Types above µ¤ ﬁnd it optimal to bid their value for the same reasons as in
a second-price auction without resale.
The arguments so far show that E(p) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Finally, let us show that in equilibrium the speculator’s resale revenue is
bounded above by her period-1 bid. The proof can be found in Appendix
B.
Lemma 5 Given the construction above, P0
s · b¤
s.
16The proof uses the fact that the speculator’s resale revenue is bounded
above by the average resale payment of the highest type, µ¤, who participates
in the resale mechanism. To keep type µ¤ indiﬀerent between waiting for
resale and buying the good at price b¤
s in period 1, her average resale payment
must be below b¤
s.
Summarizing the above results, we now have the following.
Proposition 1 Consider a second-price auction with resale. For all q 2
(0;1], a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in which the speculator bids b¤
s >
0 in period 1 and wins the initial auction with probability q. The speculator’s
payment when she wins is 0, and her expected resale revenue conditional on





The speculator’s expected payoﬀ is given by
us(b¤
s) = q±P0
s > 0: (16)
An important property of these equilibria is (15): the speculator would
make losses if she had to pay her own bid in the initial auction. A potential
second speculator must at least match the ﬁrst speculator’s bid in order to
win with positive probability in period 1. Equation (15) shows that by doing
so she would make losses, provided the outcome of the resale market does
not change due to the presence of the second speculator.7 In this sense, our
equilibria remain valid with free entry of speculators.
Because the speculator wins the initial auction with positive probability,
a delayed allocation sometimes occurs. Therefore, none of the equilibria
are eﬃcient. Even ignoring ineﬃciencies due to delay, typical resale markets
will induce an ineﬃcient allocation in the sense that the speculator keeps the
good with positive probability (e.g., when the speculator’s resale mechanism
is a second-price auction with optimal reserve price), or a buyer who does not
have the highest value can end up with the good (e.g., when the speculator’s
resale mechanism is an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer).
There always exists an equilibrium, E(1), where the expected revenue of
the initial seller is zero. I.e., speculation can harm the initial seller whenever
there are at least two buyers.
7Formally including multiple speculators into the model would complicate the presen-
tation. Assumptions about posterior beliefs in the presence of multiple speculators would
have to be made. We expect that equilibria with multiple active speculators playing mixed
strategies exist as well.
17English Auction
The equilibria that we have constructed remain valid if the second-price
auction in period 1 is replaced by an English auction. The main diﬀerence is
that in an English auction the losing bids become public during the auction,
so that bidders revise their beliefs each time a bidder drops out. In the spirit
of our equilibria, the speculator believes that she deﬁnitely will not win the
auction as soon as a positive standing high bid is reached (because then she
believes that some buyer’s value is greater than µ¤). It is therefore optimal
for her to drop out at price b¤
s.8 If a buyer with value less than or equal to
µ¤ deviates and drops out at some price between 0 and b¤
s, the speculator
revises her belief and believes the buyer’s value is µ¤ (or above µ¤, which
would also support our equilibrium).
5 Resale via a Second-Price Auction with Optimal
Reserve Price
In this section, we focus on the case where the speculator’s resale mecha-
nism is a second-price auction with optimal reserve price. This mechanism
is particularly attractive because, in our equilibria, it maximizes resale rev-
enue among all conceivable mechanisms if F(¢) satisﬁes a regularity property
(Myerson, 1981). We have two results.
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibria that we constructed in the pre-
vious section remain valid if any buyer who wins in period 1 can oﬀer the
good for resale herself; i.e., in equilibrium no buyer will attempt to resell
even if she can. This holds true no matter what resale mechanism the win-
ning buyer uses. In particular, our equilibria remain valid if every agent,
buyer or speculator, can oﬀer the good for resale via a second-price auction
with an optimal reserve price.
Proposition 3 shows that there always exists an equilibrium such that
the initial seller’s expected revenue is higher than in an environment without
resale. This implies that a revenue maximizing seller who cannot set a
positive reserve price can always have an incentive to allow resale and attract
a speculator.
8This assumes the absence of bidding costs. On the other hand, in a dynamic context
there might be a beneﬁt from bidding up to b
¤
s, because the speculator wants everybody
to believe that she is willing to bid up to b
¤
s in future auctions.
18Proposition 2 For any q 2 (0;1], consider the proﬁle E(q) constructed in
the previous section for the case where the speculator’s resale mechanism is
a second-price auction with optimal reserve price.
Then, E(q) remains an equilibrium if any buyer who wins the initial
auction can oﬀer the good for resale and can obtain the total surplus that is
available in the resale market.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. It is suﬃcient to consider a
deviation of a buyer with a value in [0;µ¤] to a bid in (b¤
s;µ¤]. Bidding more
than µ¤ cannot be optimal because in the event that the buyer needs such a
high bid in order to win, her payment in period 1 equals the highest value
among the other bidders. The proof makes no use of the assumption that
reserve prices are chosen optimally. In fact, the result holds for any reserve
price. In particular, it holds even if the speculator cannot set any positive
reserve price.
The next result shows that speculation can enhance the initial seller’s
expected revenue. This happens in equilibria with a small winning prob-
ability for the speculator. The surprising aspect of this result is that it
holds no matter how many buyers are in the market, although in a market
with many buyers and value-bidding the initial seller already appropriates
almost all of the available surplus. The proof, in Appendix B, requires that
the distribution function for buyer values is suﬃciently smooth.
Proposition 3 Assume that F(¢) is diﬀerentiable n+1 times. Let ¼(q) de-
note the initial seller’s expected revenue in the equilibrium E(q) constructed
in the previous section, for the case where the speculator’s resale mechanism
is a second-price auction with optimal reserve price. Let ¼(0) denote the ex-
pected revenue of the initial seller when every agent bids her value in period
1 and consumes the good immediately if she wins.
Then we have ¼(q) > ¼(0) for all q suﬃciently close to 0.
Note that there exist two distinct events that cause the revenue in an
equilibrium with speculation to diﬀer from the revenue that arises from
value-bidding and immediate consumption. Event (i) is that µ¤ is between
the highest and the second-highest value, in which case revenue rises to µ¤,
and event (ii) is that µ¤ is above the highest value, in which case revenue
falls to 0. If q (and thus µ¤) is close to 1 then the probability of (i) is small
and the probability of (ii) is large, allowing expected revenue to be reduced.
If q (and thus µ¤) is close to 0 then both probabilities are small; in fact, it
turns out that the kth order eﬀect of introducing a small µ¤ is zero for all
19k < n, but the nth order eﬀect is positive. Therefore, if µ¤ is close to 0 then
speculation enhances the initial seller’s expected revenue.
6 What if the Initial Seller Can Set a Reserve
Price?
So far we have considered an environment where the initial seller does not
use a reserve price. Now suppose she sets a reserve price r ¸ 0. Suppose
further that she is committed to not oﬀer the good in period 2 if she does
not sell it in period 1. The rules of the game are as before, except that
any bid below r is to be identiﬁed with non-participation. The deﬁnition of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be easily adapted. Any equilibrium E(q)
with b¤
s ¸ r naturally corresponds to a strategy-belief vector E(r;q) in the
game with reserve price r. We have two results.
Proposition 4 shows that equilibria with speculation can exist even if
there is a reserve price in the initial auction.
Proposition 5 considers the game where the initial seller chooses a re-
serve price that maximizes her expected revenue. The speculator’s resale
mechanism is assumed to be a second-price auction with optimal reserve
price. We show that an equilibrium exists in which the initial seller sets
a reserve price above the price she would set in the absence of resale, and
obtains a smaller revenue.
The proof of the following result is a straightforward adaptation from
Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose the initial seller commits to a reserve price r such
that r · ±P0
s for some q 2 (0;1]. Then E(r;q) is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium and the speculator’s resulting expected payoﬀ is q(±P0
s ¡ r).
This result shows in particular that even a substantial reserve price might
not prevent speculation if there exist many buyers, discounting is small, and
the speculator’s resale mechanism is a second-price auction with an optimal
reserve price. This is because for large n, the resale revenue P0
s tends to µ¤.
In particular, for any given reserve r < 1, the vector E(r;1) is an equilibrium
if n is suﬃciently large and ± is suﬃciently close to 1.
Now consider the game where the initial seller can choose any reserve
price before the initial auction starts. We assume that the initial seller’s
20payoﬀ equals her expected revenue. Proposition 5 then shows that the pos-
sibility of resale can harm the initial seller (given our assumption that there
are at least two buyers in the market).
Proposition 5 Consider the game where the initial seller chooses a revenue
maximizing reserve price before the initial auction starts. Suppose the spec-
ulator’s resale mechanism is a second-price auction with an optimal reserve
price.
Let r1 denote the largest among the reserve prices that are optimal for
the initial seller if all agents bid their values in period 1 and the winner
consumes the good immediately; let ¼¤ denote the resulting expected revenue
of the initial seller.
If ± is suﬃciently close to 1 then there exists an equilibrium such that the
initial seller sets a reserve price r > r1 and her expected revenue is smaller
than her no-resale revenue ¼¤.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that n ¸ 2 implies r1 < P0
s for q = 1 (because
r1 is an optimal reserve price for the speculator in period 2 and there is
positive probability that at least 2 buyers’ values are above r1). Therefore,
r1 < ±P0
s for all ± is suﬃciently close to 1. Deﬁne r = (r1 + ±P0
s )=2. Now
suppose that equilibrium E(ˆ r;1) is played following any reserve price ˆ r < r,
but value-bidding and immediate consumption occurs following any reserve
price ˆ r > r. Following the reserve price ˆ r = r, suppose that either E(ˆ r;1) is
played or value-bidding and immediate consumption occurs, depending on
which of these two leads to a higher expected revenue for the initial seller.
Given these strategies, every reserve price ˆ r < r results in an expected
revenue of ˆ r for the initial seller. Thus, some reserve price r ¸ r is optimal.
No reserve price ˆ r > r can result in an expected revenue of ¼¤ because
otherwise ˆ r would be optimal in the absence of resale, contradicting our
assumption that r1 is maximal. To complete the proof, we have to exclude
the possibility that the reserve price ˆ r = r results in an expected revenue of
¼¤ = r. But this would imply ¼¤ = r < P0
s , which is impossible because in
period 2 the speculator faces the same market as the initial seller in period
1 if resale is impossible.
217 Remarks and Extensions
1. Our equilibria are quite robust with respect to the initial seller’s bid
announcement policy.9 Whatever the policy, the winner learns the
second-highest bid from her payment p1, and this information is suf-
ﬁcient to make the inferences that support our equilibria. Moreover,
in equilibrium the third-highest and lower bids (as well as the identity
of the respective bidders) reveal no relevant information that is not
already revealed by the second-highest bid; the same is true after any
single-agent deviation from her equilibrium bid in period 1.
2. Our equilibria are quite robust with respect to the speciﬁcation of the
speculator’s oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs (i.e., her beliefs after she wins
at a positive price). For concreteness, suppose the speculator’s resale
mechanism is a second-price auction with optimal reserve. For exam-
ple, the oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs might be identical to the beliefs
after winning at 0; i.e., the speculator simply believes that the deviator
is a buyer type who was supposed to bid 0.10 Given such beliefs, the
buyer’s deviation has no impact on the resale market outcome, and
thus the deviation is not proﬁtable. Generally, any oﬀ-equilibrium-
path beliefs such that the deviation leads to a weakly increased resale
reserve price support our equilibria. To give an example of beliefs that
do not generally support our equilibria, suppose that the speculator
believes that the deviator is a buyer who, incorrectly, plays her part in
a bid-your-value equilibrium. I.e., for all p1 2 (0;b¤
s], after winning at
price p1 the speculator believes that one buyer’s value equals p1 and
everybody else’s value is distributed on [0;µ¤]. In the case of a market
with a single buyer (n = 1), the resulting resale price is p1, and thus
for types close to µ¤ it is proﬁtable to deviate to a small positive bid.
3. Assumption 1, that the speculator has full bargaining power in the
case where she is certain about the available surplus, can easily be
relaxed in the case where there is only one buyer and one speculator in
the market. Suppose that after the speculator wins, with probability
¸ 2 (0;1) the speculator makes a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer and with
probability 1 ¡ ¸ the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer. Consider
a buyer with value µ¤. Her expected payoﬀ from waiting for resale is
±(µ¤¡¸r¤), while her expected payoﬀ from bidding her value is µ¤¡b¤
s.
9See Calzolari and Pavan (2002) for an analysis of bid announcement policies in optimal
auctions with resale.
10We thank Bill Zame for suggesting these beliefs.
22These payoﬀs are equal for some b¤
s 2 (0;µ¤). A buyer with value
µi < µ¤ who deviates to a bid in (0;b¤
s) obtains the payoﬀ ±(1 ¡ ¸)µi,
given the speculator’s belief that her type is µ¤. Therefore, she prefers
to bid 0.
4. It is natural to ask whether the speculator’s oﬀ-equilibrium-path be-
liefs that support our equilibria are reasonable. One way of addressing
this issue is to reduce our game to a standard signaling game and show
that our equilibria do not fail the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987).
Let us construct a reduced game based on some equilibrium E(q), for
the case where the speculator’s resale mechanism is a second-price
auction with optimal reserve. Consider a buyer i = 1;:::;n, ﬁx all
other buyers’ equilibrium strategies, and ﬁx the speculator’s period-1
equilibrium bid b¤
s. Then the auction with resale is reduced to a sig-
naling game in which buyer i’s bid bi is a message, and the speculator
as the receiver responds with a period-2 reserve price r (in the event
that the speculator does not win in period 1, the reserve price is not
payoﬀ-relevant).
The intuitive criterion is implicitly concerned with posterior beliefs
generated by bids that are oﬀ the equilibrium path. Our assignment of
positive probability to type µ¤ given any bi 2 (0;µ¤] conforms with the
intuitive criterion because there exists an undominated reserve price r
such that bidding bi is at least as good for type µ¤ as the equilibrium
bid bi(µ¤) = 0. Any r less than or equal to the equilibrium resale
reserve price works. First, any r 2 [0;1] is undominated. Second,
in the case bi 2 (b¤
s;µ¤], buyer i still wins against the speculator in
period 1. Third, in case bi 2 (0;b¤
s), the speculator wins against buyer
i and the reserve price r that i faces in period 2 is not larger than in
equilibrium. Fourth, buyer i’s expected payoﬀ from bi = b¤
s is a convex
combination of the payoﬀs from the previous two cases.
5. We may also ask whether there is a natural way to select among the
equilibria of the second price auction with resale. We have computed
a continuum of equilibria E(q) (q 2 (0;1]), and there is the equilib-
rium outcome where buyers always bid their values and the good is
consumed in period 1. Let us focus on the case where the speculator’s
resale mechanism is a second-price auction with optimal reserve.
Consider Pareto domination. No equilibrium dominates another even
though we do not consider the seller’s payoﬀ. First compare our equi-
23libria to the value-bidding outcome. The speculator is better oﬀ in
our equilibria because with value-bidding she makes no proﬁt. On
the other hand, one can show that buyers are weakly worse oﬀ in our
equilibria compared to value-bidding, no matter what their values are,
and buyers with small values are strictly worse oﬀ because their payoﬀ
drops to 0.
None of our equilibria Pareto dominates another even though we do
not consider the seller. The speculator’s payoﬀ is strictly increasing in
her winning probability q. The equilibrium reserve price in period 2,
r¤, is also strictly increasing in q (this can be shown using the strict
monotone comparative statics techniques of Edlin and Shannon, 1998).
Therefore, any buyer with a value in (r¤;µ¤] is strictly worse oﬀ when
q is increased.
A selection criterion that has bite is strictness on the equilibrium path.
This criterion can be justiﬁed via a stability condition in a dynamic
evolutionary context (Binmore and Samuelson, 1999). The criterion
favors value-bidding to our equilibria. For equilibria based on value-
bidding, every agent of any type is worse oﬀ when deviating from the
equilibrium path. This is not the case for our equilibria. For example,
buyers with low values are indiﬀerent between bidding their value and
bidding 0 in period 1. However, our equilibria become strict on the
equilibrium path for all buyer types if we allow non-participation as
a possible action and, keeping the period-2 outcome ﬁxed, any buyer
strictly prefers non-participation in the initial auction to the outcome
“participate and win with probability 0.” The speculator, while be-
ing indiﬀerent between all bids in (0;µ¤), must bid b¤
s in order to as-
sure optimality of the buyers’ bid functions. Therefore, assuming the
speculator is forward looking, our equilibria might have good stability
properties in dynamic contexts. This question must be left for future
research.
6. Suppose speculators are excluded. Ineﬃcient equilibria can exist in
this case as well, but are more diﬃcult to construct. Assume there
exist 2 buyers with values independently and uniformly distributed on
[0;1], and there is no discounting (± = 1). The auction winner can
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the loser in period 2.
Suppose that buyer 1 uses a bid function with some threshold µ¤ as
in the equilibria that we have constructed. For buyer 2, it is then
optimal to bid b¤
2 = (3=4)µ¤ if her value is below µ¤, and otherwise bid
24her value. Buyer 2 with type µ2 < µ¤ makes the resale oﬀer (µ¤+µ2)=2
if she wins at price 0 (and consumes the good in period 2 if her oﬀer if
rejected) and makes the resale oﬀer µ¤ if she wins at a price in (0;µ¤).
An explicit computation now shows that all types µ1 2 [0;µ¤) prefer
to wait for resale rather than overbid b¤
2 and oﬀer the good for resale
themselves.
Generalizing this equilibrium construction appears diﬃcult. Even the
case of a uniform distribution with discounting quickly gets compli-
cated because all types µ2 suﬃciently close to µ¤ would not oﬀer the
good for resale, but instead consume the good in period 1; i.e., we
would have diﬀerent thresholds µ¤
2 < µ¤
1. In case ± ¼ 0 the equilibrium
construction deﬁnitely breaks down because then µ¤
2 ¼ 0 and thus type
µ¤
1 cannot be made indiﬀerent between bidding her value and waiting
for resale.
Appendix A: Conditional distribution functions
Let us review the deﬁning conditions for the conditional distribution func-
tions that we deﬁned on p. 8 (for more see Billingsley, 1995, Ch. 33). These
conditions generalize Bayes rule from discrete to arbitrary probability dis-
tributions.
For all buyers i and bi ¸ 0, the function
Π
bi
i (¢ j ¢) : [0;1]n¡1 £ [0;1) ! [0;1]
is a conditional distribution function if (i) for all p1 ¸ 0, the function Πi(¢;p1)
is a probability distribution function, (ii) for all µ¡i = µ¡i¡s 2 [0;1]n¡1, the
function Π(µ¡i;¢) is Borel measurable, and (iii)
8p1 ¸ 0;µ¡i 2 [0;1]n¡1 :
Z p1
0
Πi(µ¡i j b)dGi(b) = Pr[˜ µ¡i · µ¡i; ˜ p
bi
i · p1];




Πs(¢ j ¢) : [0;1]n £ [0;1) ! [0;1]
is a conditional distribution function if (i) for all p1 ¸ 0, the function
Πs(¢;p1) is a probability distribution function, (ii) for all µ 2 [0;1]n, the
function Π(µ;¢) is Borel measurable, and (iii)
8p1 ¸ 0;µ 2 [0;1]n :
Z p1
0
Πi(µ j b)dGs(b) = Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ p1
s · p1];
25where Gs(¢) denotes the probability distribution function for ˜ p1
s.
It is important to note that posteriors are not uniquely determined by the
underlying random variables. Consider any buyer i. If P µ [0;1) is Borel
measurable and Pr[˜ p
bi
i 2 P] = 0 then for all p1 2 P the posterior distribution
Π
bi
i (¢;p1) can be changed without violating the conditions above. I.e., after
a probability-0 event the posterior is essentially left unrestricted by the
conditions. Up to this degree of freedom, conditional distribution functions
are uniquely determined by the underlying random variables. More precisely,
if Π(¢ j ¢) and Λ(¢ j ¢) are both conditional distribution functions then, for
any given µ¡i 2 [0;1]n¡1, we have Π(µ¡i j ˜ p
bi
i ) = Λ(µ¡i j ˜ p
bi
i ) with probability
1.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Let us ﬁrst show that Πs(¢ j ¢) is a conditional distribution
function for ˜ µ conditional on ˜ p1
s. Conditions (i) and (ii) are immediate. The
distribution function for ˜ p1
s is given by
Gs(b) = F(maxfb;µ¤g)n:
To verify the integral condition (iii), consider any vector µ = (µ1;:::;µn) 2
[0;1]n. Whenever p1 · µ¤ condition (iii) is satisﬁed because
Z p1
0





= Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ p1
s = 0]:




























= nPr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ µi 2 (µ¤;p1]; ˜ µ(1) = ˜ µi];
where ˜ µ(1) denotes the random variable for the highest value among all
buyers. Note that the ﬁrst and the last expression in above equality chain
are identical even if µi · µ¤ because then both expressions are 0. Summing















= Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ µ(1) 2 (µ¤;p1]]
for all µ 2 [0;1]n and all b > µ¤. Using this, we can verify condition (iii) for




= Πs(µ j 0)Gs(0) + Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ µ(1) 2 (µ¤;p1]]
= Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ p1
s = 0] + Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ p1
s 2 (µ¤;p1]]
= Pr[˜ µ · µ; ˜ p1
s · p1]:
For the buyers’ posterior beliefs, conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) can be veriﬁed
in a similar way.
Proof of Lemma 3. Condition (13) holds by Assumption 2. From Lemma
1 we know that P(¢) is increasing. Together with (13) this implies that
P(µi) > 0 for all µi suﬃciently close to µ¤. Hence, (7) implies Q(µi) > 0 for
27such µi. Lemma 1 now implies that





i + P(0) > 0:
Together with P(µ¤) > 0 and because Q(µ¤) < 1 this yields
0 < µ¤Q(µ¤) ¡ P(µ¤) < µ¤:
Therefore, b¤
s 2 (0;µ¤). This shows that the speculator wins in period 1 with
probability Fn(µ¤) = q and if she wins then it is at price 0. Therefore, her
expected payoﬀ is given by (12).
Proof of Lemma 4. Deﬁne ∆(µi) = (ui(µ¤;µi) ¡ ui(0;µi))=Fn¡1(µ¤). Using
(11) and (14) we ﬁnd
∆(µ¤) = µ¤ ¡ b¤
s ¡ (µ¤Q(µ¤) ¡ P(µ¤)) = 0:
Lemma 1 implies













Hence, ∆(µi) is increasing in µi, which implies the result.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let µ = infQ(µ)>0 µ. By Lemma 1 we have P(µ1) = 0 for
all µ1 < µ. Therefore, Lemma 3 implies
P0
s = nE[P(µ1) j µ < µ1 · µ¤]: (17)















Now let us show that
8µ1;µ0
1 2 (µ;µ¤] : if µ0



















From individual rationality (7) we get
µ1Q(µ1) ¡ P(µ1) ¸ 0:
Multiplying by Q(µ1) ¡ Q(µ0
1) yields
µ1(Q(µ1)2 ¡ Q(µ1)Q(µ0
1)) ¡ P(µ1)Q(µ1) + P(µ1)Q(µ0
1) ¸ 0; (21)




implying (19). Using (17), (19), and (18), we obtain
P0
















as was to be shown.
Proof of Proposition 2. At ﬁrst let us compute the speculator’s equilibrium
bid. Using Lemma 1, we ﬁnd that
b¤








where r¤ 2 (0;µ¤) is the speculator’s optimal reserve price given her posterior
Πs(¢ j 0).
Now suppose that buyer i with type µi · µ¤ deviates to a bid bi 2 (b¤
s;µ¤]
and oﬀers the good for resale if she wins (once we have shown that this is not
proﬁtable, it follows that no other deviation is proﬁtable either). Suppose
that if she wins she expects to obtain the total surplus that is available in
the resale market. In cases where another buyer’s value is larger than µ¤, her
29deviation has no payoﬀ consequences. So let us consider her expected payoﬀ
conditional on no buyer’s value being larger than µ¤. When she deviates




















i if µi ¸ r¤;
0 if µi < r¤:







































= ¡(1 ¡ ±)µ¤ · 0:
(23)
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ˜ µ(1) and ˜ µ(2) denote the highest and second
highest value among the buyers. Deﬁning T(µ¤) = ¼(q)¡¼(0) for Fn(µ¤) =
q, we have
T(µ¤) = Pr[˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)](b¤
s ¡ E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)])
+Pr[˜ µ(1) < µ¤](0 ¡ E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(1) < µ¤]):
The distribution function for ˜ µ(2) conditional on the event ˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1),
can be computed as follows (for all µi · µ¤):
Pr[˜ µ(2) · µi j ˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)] =
Pr[˜ µ(2) · µi;µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)]







So, the respective density is given by (n¡1)F(µi)n¡2=F(µ¤)n¡1f(µi), where
f = F0. Similarly, the distribution function for ˜ µ(2) conditional on the event
30˜ µ(1) < µ¤, can be computed as follows (for all µ · µ¤):
Pr[˜ µ(2) · µi j ˜ µ(1) < µ¤] =
nF(µi)n¡1(F(µ¤) ¡ F(µi)) + F(µi)n
F(µ¤)n
=
nF(µi)n¡1F(µ¤) ¡ (n ¡ 1)F(µi)n
F(µ¤)n
So, the respective density is given by
n(n ¡ 1)(F(µi)n¡2F(µ¤) ¡ F(µi)n¡1)
F(µ¤)n f(µi):
Using this, we get
T(µ¤) = n(1 ¡ F(µ¤))F(µ¤)n¡1
¢
Ã
























= n(1 ¡ F(µ¤))F(µ¤)n¡1(1 ¡ ±)µ¤ + n(1 ¡ F(µ¤))±F(r¤)n¡1r¤


















where r¤ 2 (0;µ¤) denotes the speculator’s optimal reserve price given her












31Using this and three other integrations by parts, we get





























































The implicit functions theorem implies that there exists a diﬀerentiable func-
tion g(¢) on [0;²) for some ² > 0 such that









Using standard calculus methods, one sees that g(¢) is diﬀerentiable n times.
Well known results (Myerson, 1981) imply that g(µ¤) is an optimal reserve
price in a second-price auction with n buyers with values independently
distributed according to ˆ Fµ¤(¢) when the seller has 0 value; i.e., we can












¡F(µ¤)n ¡ nµ¤F(µ¤)n¡1f(µ¤) ¡ (n ¡ 1)F(µ¤)n:






¡n(1 ¡ F(µ¤))±(n ¡ 1)!f(µ¤)n¡1 ¡
1 ¡ g0(µ¤)n¢
+n!f(µ¤)n¡1 + (:::)F(µ¤) + (:::)F(r¤) + (:::)µ¤:













By the same methods, one sees that







Therefore, a Taylor expansion of T(¢) around 0 shows that T(µ¤) > 0 if µ¤
is suﬃciently close to 0. QED
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